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Abstract Legal systems differ markedly on how they treat
the emotional harm suffered by close family members of
crime or accident victims. This paper reports the results of
two empirical studies examining how citizens whose child,
partner, or parent was killed or seriously injured as a result
of violent crime or tort (secondary victims) perceive a
monetary award for their own non-economic harm relating
to the death or injury of their loved one. The objective of
our research was to test the Dutch legislator’s assumption
that a (modest) monetary award for secondary victims’
emotional harm can have a meaningful symbolic value by
providing recognition and satisfaction. Until then, no
compensation was available for such harm under Dutch
law. In addition, we examined whether victims’ relatives
preferred standardization or individuation in determining
the amount of the award, how they evaluated the amount,
and the manner in which such awards might be offered. In a
first quantitative survey study conducted in the Nether-
lands, 726 secondary victims were asked for their evalua-
tions of such awards for the emotional harm they suffered
as a result of the death or injury of their family member. We
also asked our representative sample about their actual
experience of the legal process in order to put their
evaluations of such awards into context. In a second
qualitative study, conducted in Belgium, interviews were
held with 14 secondary victims who had actually received
an award for their own emotional harm under Belgian law
(study 2). Results suggest that secondary victims regard an
award for emotional harm as a positive gesture and may
interpret it as helping to satisfy relatives’ psychological
concerns by seeing it, for example, as an acknowledgment
of loss and responsibility. Overall findings suggest that
victims’ relatives may be seeking acknowledgement of their
emotional losses and the norm violation.
Keywords Bereavement.Personal injury.Tort.
Compensation.Restorative justice
The death or severe injury of a child, spouse, or parent is
one of the most stressful life events. Close family members
of victims may experience grief, psychological distress, a
period of adjustment, loss of identity, and family cohesion,
while also being at a higher risk of depression and anxiety
disorders (e.g., Lehman et al. 1993; Middleton et al. 1997;
Stroebe et al. 2008). Close relatives of victims may even
make more negative cognitive interpretations of the harm-
doer’s intentions and responsibility for the offense and
experience more negative affect than the primary victims
themselves (Green et al. 2008). How people feel treated
after a traumatic event may well affect how they recover.
The extent to which an injured victim or a survivor
experiences positive reactions from society that acknowl-
edge the victim’s state and situation may perhaps enhance
recovery from posttraumatic stress disorder (Maercker and
Müller 2004).
This paper examines how close relatives of those killed
or seriously injured as a result of a tort or violent crime
perceive a monetary award for the emotional harm they
suffered as a result of the death or severe injury of their
loved one. We investigated whether victims’ relatives
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DOI 10.1007/s12207-011-9110-7actually felt a need to receive a monetary award for their
own emotional harm and whether they thought that a
(modest) monetary award could have a meaningful sym-
bolic value by providing them with acknowledgment.
These assumptions formed the basis for a Dutch legislative
proposal introducing a right to a financial award in order to
provide “recognition and satisfaction” for emotional losses
suffered by a narrowly defined circle of close relatives of
people killed or severely injured in crimes or accidents for
which another person was liable. The Dutch Bill explicitly
stated that its aim was not to offer real compensation as no
monetary award could make up for the harm in question.
Two other main focuses of our research were how
victims’ relatives thought the award should be offered (in
order to meet the aim of providing acknowledgment), as
well as whether they preferred standardization over indi-
viduation in determining the amount of the award. We
examined the Dutch legislator’s line of reasoning that it is
better to provide victims’ relatives with a fixed, uniform
sum rather than force them to go through difficult and
lengthy discussions about the “right” amount since money
cannot compensate for these losses anyway. Our research
was commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Justice and
requested by the Dutch Senate.
The Dutch Bill and our research were based on the
central assumption that victims’ relatives are not only
motivated by instrumental (e.g., monetary) interests but
also by non-instrumental (e.g., non-monetary) concerns,
and we examined whether an award could help meet these
non-instrumental concerns. Such a view of human nature is
accepted in social psychology (Miller 1999; Tyler and Lind
1992). Our approach differed, however, from the line taken
in some of the literature based on economic approaches of
tort law, in which people are essentially viewed as rational
economic actors driven by self-interest.
1
More specifically, we examined whether victims’ rela-
tives felt that an award could help meet secondary victims’
non-instrumental (or non-pecuniary, psychological, emo-
tional) needs and motivations that have been identified in
existing (mainly English language) literature on what tort
and crime victims and their families want. In other words,
we investigated whether secondary victims perceived an
award as contributing to, for instance, recognition of the
harm caused to the primary victim and the family,
acknowledgment of responsibility for the harm, and
attention and respect for the secondary victim as a person
(study 1). We inferred that these were important non-
instrumental needs and motivations of victims’ relatives
from (a) an earlier systematic review (in Dutch) of 33
empirical studies of needs of crime victims (Ten Boom and
Kuijpers 2008, referring to Baurmann and Schädler 1991;
Feldthusen et al. 2000; Maguire and Kynch 2000; see also
for relatives of crime victims, Wortman et al. 1997); (b) an
earlier review (in Dutch) of existing international empirical
studies and literature relevant to the needs of tort victims
(Huver et al. 2007, including, e.g., Bismark et al. 2006;
Hensler et al. 1991; Lind et al. 1990; Lind and Tyler 1998;
Shuman 1994); and (c) a previous Dutch exploratory
qualitative study based on semi-structured interviews with
43 primary and 18 secondary victims of tort. A more
detailed discussion of these earlier literature reviews and
the exploratory study is beyond the scope of the present
paper.
Below we will explain the Dutch Bill in more detail.
This is followed by an overview of our research questions
and our two studies. Firstly, we will briefly discuss whether
monetary compensation to close relatives of tort and crime
victims is allowed in various jurisdictions.
Background: Jurisdictional Differences in Allowing
Damages for Emotional Harm to Victims’ Relatives
Legal systems differ vastly in how they treat non-economic
losses of close relatives of victims of crime or tort resulting
from the death or severe injury of a loved one. The main
idea behind decisions not to allow damages for such harm
is that the harm to those relatives is too remote and/or that
such emotional harm cannot be expressed in monetary
terms. In other words, money cannot restore the family to a
pre-harm condition.
A majority of European countries,
2 however, do recog-
nize damages for non-pecuniary harm suffered by close
family members consequent on the wrongful death of the
primary victim, although the systems applied vary (Bona et
al. 2005, p. 422). A substantial number of European
countries also allow damages for non-pecuniary harm
suffered by close family members living with a permanent-
ly disabled primary tort victim (Bona et al. 2005, p. 426).
3
The range of eligible persons varies, but usually the spouse,
children, and parents of a minor can receive monetary
compensation for non-pecuniary harm because of the
emotional impact that the injury to the primary victim has
had on them (Bona et al. 2005). Most countries make no
distinction between grief and (non-economic) loss of
relationship, consortium, society, companionship, care,
1 This literature focuses on how to calculate the level of compensation
for non-economic harm based on insurance theory, e.g., Avraham
2005. Compare further deterrence literature, e.g., Posner and Sunstein
(2005).
2 Including the UK, Ireland, Greece, Bulgaria, Iceland, Turkey,
Liechtenstein, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Luxem-
bourg, Belgium, Serbia, Slovenia, and Croatia
3 Including France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Luxembourg,
Belgium, Serbia, Slovenia, and Croatia
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relative is generally not required to suffer from a medically
diagnosed psychiatric condition (Bona et al. 2005). Only a
minority of European countries (the Netherlands, Germany,
and Denmark) do not allow any such claims for compen-
sation of emotional harm to victims’ relatives.
Only a minority of US states officially permit damages
for grief to be awarded to a victim’s surviving relatives after
wrongful death (e.g., McClurg 2005; Oswald and Powd-
thavee 2008; Posner and Sunstein 2005). However, courts
in a substantial number of US states allow damages to be
awarded for loss of society and companionship (McClurg
2005; Posner and Sunstein 2005). In Australia, tort law
does not make any provision for non-pecuniary damages to
be awarded to family members of those killed or severely
injured in crimes or accidents in the absence of recognized
medical injury of the family member (Luntz 2006).
Dutch Legislative Proposal
In the Netherlands, we have regularly seen cases being
taken to court by people seeking non-pecuniary compensa-
tion after the wrongful death or severe injury of their child,
but these have generally been to no avail.
4 In the case of
wrongful death, dependents can only sue for lost mainte-
nance. As a child has no income and no dependants, its
parents will only receive reimbursement of funeral
expenses. The Dutch legislator saw this as indicative of a
divergence between what members of the public who had
experienced such a loss felt that the law should be and what
the Dutch legal system held that the law required and
should provide. This led to a Bill introducing the right to a
financial award for emotional losses suffered by a narrowly
defined circle of close relatives of those killed or severely
injured in crimes or accidents for which another person was
liable. These relatives (partners, children, and parents) with
a close family or comparable relationship to the primary
victim are also referred to here as secondary victims. Under
the Bill, the person liable for the loss should pay a fixed
amount (initially set at 10,000 €, which was equivalent to
around USD 13,500 in February 2011) to the victim’s
family member. In practice, these costs would almost
always be borne by the harm-doer’s insurer, or by a violent
crime victim compensation fund. As mentioned above, the
Bill explicitly stated that money could not truly make up for
the emotional losses of victim’s relatives. The aim of
providing such an award was to offer recognition and
satisfaction to victims’ relatives and not to offer actual
compensation for relatives’ emotional harm. Consequently,
the use of the word “compensation” in this article is not
meant to signify making up for such non-compensable
harm. The legislator’s line of reasoning in opting for a
fixed, uniform sum was that relatives should be spared from
having to go through discussions about the “right” amount
since money cannot actually compensate for their losses.
Discussions in Dutch legal literature over the previous
decade focused mainly on whether to set fixed or variable
sums for this new type of award.
Overview of the Research
The two main research questions we sought to answer were
as follows:
1. Do close family members of those killed or severely
injured as a result of a tort or violent crime actually feel
a need to receive a monetary award for emotional harm
following the death or severe injury of their loved one?
2. Do these family members feel that receiving such
monetary award for emotional harm would help satisfy
secondary victims’ non-instrumental (or non-pecuniary,
psychological, and emotional) needs?
This can therefore be seen as an empirical study of
whether “such awards [for non-economic suffering can
serve] as tools for reconstructing meaning in the face of
suffering,” as suggested by Schatman and Sullivan (2010,
p. 190). The question of whether secondary victims see a
monetary award as an acceptable and even helpful response
to their emotional losses is also interesting, given the
psychological theory and evidence on “taboo trade-offs.”
This theory posits that people consider life, health, and love
to be sacred values. In other words, things we must treat as
infinitely important and which are qualitatively different
from money (Fiske and Tetlock 1997; Tetlock et al. 2000).
We wondered whether quantifying the suffering caused to
the family by the lost life or lost health of a loved one might
also be seen as an inappropriate “taboo trade-off” or even
provoke indignation and anger in victims’ families.
In our research, we also examined secondary victims’
preferences for a fixed sum vs. a variable sum in order to
test the legislator’s assumption that secondary victims
would obtain more relief from a fixed sum. We also
examined how relatives regarded the intended modest
amount of the award (research questions 3). In addition,
we asked for respondents’ thoughts on how the award
should be offered (research question 4). Given that the aim
of the award is to symbolize acknowledgment, we also
examined the mode of offering because previous research
4 Under Dutch law, damages for non-pecuniary losses can only be
awarded to close relatives of the primary victim if the relative
witnessed the incident in which the primary victim was injured, and
this resulted in the relative suffering from a medically diagnosed
psychiatric illness. The conditions imposed are, however, relatively
strict, and most claims are denied.
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seeking compensation of economic losses as burdensome
(Huver et al. 2007). Lastly, we investigated how our main
outcomes related to a number of demographic and
explanatory variables such as relationship characteristics,
injury severity, and blame assigned to the harm-doer
(research question 5). We also sought to examine differ-
ences between fatal and non-fatal injuries regarding main
outcomes.
Two Studies
The Dutch Ministry of Justice commissioned us to conduct
a large-scale quantitative survey among close family
members of tort and violent crime victims in the Nether-
lands (study 1) because the Dutch Senate wanted to know
what those falling within the scope of the Dutch Bill
actually thought about an award for their own emotional
harm. We were also assigned to conduct a study of
qualitative interviews with close relatives of victims who
had actually received an award for their own emotional
harm, as allowed under Belgian law (study 2).
The objective of study 1, the main focus of our research
and this paper, was to answer the above five research
questions. The key objective of study 2 was to gain insight,
by learning from experience in Belgium, into how awards
for emotional harm should be determined and offered
(research questions 3 and 4). An additional objective of
study 2 was to complement and enrich the data acquired in
study 1 with qualitative data on the experiences of actual
recipients of awards for emotional harm suffered as a result
of the death or severe injury of a family member (Johnson
et al. 2007; Sale et al. 2002; Straus and Corbin 1998).
Severe recruitment difficulties resulted, however, in the
Belgian sample in study 2 being smaller than intended.
Hypothetical vs. Actual Award Following Actual
Emotional Harm
In study 1, Dutch secondary victims were asked for their
views on an as yet non-existent (under Dutch law) right to a
monetary award for their own emotional harm. As
explained below, any distortions from being asked about a
hypothetical award were minimized: (a) because our
respondents had suffered actual losses and (b) through
certain preventive measures. In addition, as explained
above, we conducted study 2 which involved actual
recipients of such awards for emotional harm.
Preventive Measures In study 1, we first examined how
victims’ relatives experienced various aspects of the legal
process following the death or injury of their loved one
(including the process of seeking compensation for
economic losses, their experience with the police and
the Public Prosecutor’s Office and any contact with the
offender). We also asked victims’ relatives how these
various aspects of the legal process affected their
emotional recovery and which of the elements of the
legal process they felt were, or would have been, most
beneficial to their emotional recovery (such as swifter
settlement of financial losses, acknowledgment of
responsibility by the offender or attentive treatment by
the police).
We avoided asking respondents to speculate about how a
monetary award for emotional harm would make them feel
personally. Instead, we asked them whether they had felt a
lack of attention for their personal emotional losses during
the legal processes and only then examined their opinions
and interpretations of an award for their own emotional
losses. That is, we asked secondary victims whether they
felt they should receive such an award (research question 1)
and then how they interpreted such award in the light of the
needs and motivations of secondary victims in general
(research question 2). In order to avoid overestimation of
the effect of an award, we did not focus on asking Dutch
respondents to predict how the actual receiving of such
award would fulfill their personal needs or make them feel
personally. Items not directly relating to respondents
themselves have also been shown to limit social desirability
bias (Fisher 1993).
Actual Losses Research into affective forecasting has
shown that people are generally able to identify the type
of response they will have to an event and whether it will
be positive or negative but are less able to predict the
intensity and duration of their emotional responses (Wilson
and Gilbert 2005; Blumenthal 2005). The fact that our
participants had experienced the actual death or injury of
their family member in the past minimized the potential
overestimation of the effect of an award (for identified
causes of this forecasting error, see Wilson and Gilbert
2005; Gilbert et al. 1998). Our Dutch respondents were not
predicting their emotional reactions to a future, hypothetical
loss; such predictions tend to be affected by people’s failure
to anticipate their natural tendency to make the best of bad
outcomes (Wilson and Gilbert 2005; “immune neglect”).
The fact that our respondents were asked about harm
actually suffered in the past will also have diminished their
tendency to underestimate the extent to which other events
will influence their thoughts and feelings (“focalism”).
These relatives had already had to deal psychologically
with their past traumatic loss and had experienced the
influence of other events—including the legal process they
went through—and thus might be less inclined to attribute
248 Psychol. Inj. and Law (2011) 4:245–262their “resilience” to external agents, such as compensation
or an apology (Gilbert et al. 1998). It has also been shown
that when people imagined being compensated, they
required less compensation for events that had taken place
in the past than for identical events taking place in the
future (Caruso et al. 2008). In addition, people may perhaps
be less prone to overestimate the symbolic value of an
award to alleviate non-economic suffering as opposed to
economic losses (Robbennolt 2003, for apologies).
Study 1: Survey in the Netherlands
For the purpose of answering our research questions (Q 1–5),
we developed a questionnaire that was completed online by
726 citizens of whom a close relative had died or become
severely and permanently injured in a violent crime or other
incident for which another party was liable in tort (traffic or
workplace accident or medical malpractice, all referred to
jointly as accidents).
Method in Study 1
Participants
Our main source for selecting these secondary victims was
an existing internet panel of a large market research
organization (TNS NIPO Panel). This comprises a nation-
ally representative sample of over 48,000 households in the
Netherlands. Contacts from over 47,000 households filled
in our screening instrument designed to identify secondary
victims falling within the scope of the legislative proposal.
The inclusion criteria were (a) respondent is/was the
partner, parent, or child of the primary victim; (b) the
primary victim was killed, or severely and permanently
injured; (c) in a violent crime or accident for which another
party was liable in tort
5; and (d) secondary and primary
victims share(d) the same home. We included Dutch-
speaking respondents over the age of 18 and incidents
taking place between 1990 and 2007.
All family members of severely injured victims and 55%
of surviving relatives included in study 1 came from the
TNS NIPO Panel. However, there were insufficient close
relatives of fatally injured parties within the Panel to meet
our initial aim of also examining differences between fatal
and non-fatal incidents. Additional surviving relatives were
therefore recruited through alternative channels.
6 These
accounted for the remaining 45% of the relatives of fatal
victims and 5% of the total sample included in study 1. The
sociodemographic characteristics of the group of respond-
ents included in study 1 were largely similar to those of the
general population of the Netherlands, although citizens
with a lower level of education were under-represented in
both the TNS NIPO Panel and our group of respondents
included in study 1 (11.9% vs. 23.3% in the general
population). Our respondents also included slightly more
women (56.4%) and more citizens over the age of 50 (45%
vs. 40.6% in the general population) and slightly fewer
under the age of 35 (21.9% vs. 29.2% in the general
population), but it seems reasonable to assume that the
entire population of parents, partners, and children of
accident and crime victims may differ from the general
population in this same way. TNS NIPO takes measures to
ensure demographic diversity and to prevent selectivity of
response within its Panel. In addition, a potential over-
representation or under-representation of certain groups in
the TNS NIPO Panel (such as relatives of fatally injured
victims) may also have been partly overcome by our using
alternative channels to recruit participants. All in all, the
recruitment methods used enabled us to obtain the most
representative sample that was practically achievable.
Materials
Screening Instrument Respondents were screened for eligi-
bility on the basis of whether they would fall within the
range of persons entitled to an award for emotional harm to
victims’ relatives under the Dutch Bill (see the above
inclusion criteria), using five items.
Questionnaire A multidisciplinary research team con-
structed separate items and a number of scales for
answering the five research questions. The contents of the
questionnaire were revised on the basis of expert evalua-
5 Thus, our sample included intentional harms (violent crimes) and
harms for which tort liability existed on the basis of fault (negligent or
even reckless conduct), or on the basis of strict or qualitative liability
(such as motorists liable for injuries to cyclists or pedestrians under
the age of 14).
6 A total of 23 surviving relatives of accident victims were recruited
through (a) Victim Support Netherlands, which sent out 450 invitation
letters to a random sample from a population of 8,000 surviving
relatives of fatal victims of traffic accident between 2000 and 2007,
where the family had had contact with Victim Support at least once
(which is more or less standard after major accidents), and (b)
personal injury victims’ legal representatives, who sent out 20
invitation letters. Eight surviving relatives of violent crime victims
were recruited through three different (regionally spread) organiza-
tions of family members of victims of violence, which sent out
electronic invitations to their members. We acknowledge that the 23
surviving relatives recruited outside the TNS NIPO Panel may be
more self-selected. Analyses were also, however, run without
including this group and showed no noteworthy deviations (except
that the level of blame assigned to the harm-doer no longer
significantly affected main outcomes, see research question 5).
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any of the scales of the questionnaire. The questionnaire
consisted of 90 items for surviving relatives and 99 items
for relatives of injured victims. For non-fatal incidents,
additional items were included to assess injury severity.
Most items were rated on a seven-point response scale
ranging from 1 (definitely not)t o7( definitely so), with an
additional response category of no reply/not applicable.
The questionnaire used for relatives of parties injured in
accidents was also used for relatives of violent crime
victims, but with some minor modifications in terminology.
Research Question 1: Need for an Award The extent to
which secondary victims actually feel a need to receive a
monetary award for emotional harm relating to the death or
severe injury of their family member was measured using a
scale consisting of six items (Cronbach’s α=0.85). Actual
scale items can be found in the “Appendix” (Table 3).
Research Question 2: Appreciation of an Award The extent
to which secondary victims feel that receiving a monetary
award for emotional harm would help satisfy relatives’ non-
monetary needs was measured on a scale consisting of 13
items (Cronbach’s α=0.92). Actual scale items can be
found in Table 2 (“Results and Discussion of Study 1” and
“Results and Discussion of Study 2” sections). Most items
from this scale asked whether an award for emotional harm
would help satisfy needs of relatives of victims in general
(abstracting from any effects on respondents’ personal
needs or emotional experience), using insights from
existing literature about the needs and motivations of
litigants/victims (Huver et al. 2007; Ten Boom and Kuijpers
2008) and from a qualitative Dutch study of tort victims
and their relatives’ experience of the legal compensation
process (Huver et al. 2007). The questionnaire explained
that the award would not in practice be paid by the
offender, but by the latter’s insurer or, in the case of
relatives of crime victims, by the Violent Crimes Compen-
sation Fund.
Background of Relatives’ General Needs and Experiences
in Legal Process (Used in Respect of Research Question 2)
We also wanted to be able to put respondents’
perceptions of an award for emotional harm into a
context of their general experiences and needs in the
legal compensation and/or criminal processes they went
through following the death or severe injury of the
primary victim. Items in this section asked about aspects
of the legal process (did you experience this: yes/no)
and how that aspect had (in the event of a “yes”
answer) or could have (in the event of “no”) contributed
to their emotional recovery (using the standard seven-
point scale or no reply/not applicable). Once again we
relied on existing literature on needs and motivations of
litigants/victims for the items relating to aspects of the
legal process (Huver et al. 2007; Ten Boom and Kuijpers
2008). We also asked respondents to express which three
aspects were or would have been most important for their
emotional recovery. A final item asked whether they felt
that these other three aspects were more important for their
emotional recovery than a right to an award for their
emotional harm. With the exception of the final item,
items in this section were presented prior to the items in
the scales assessing the need for, and evaluation of,
emotional harm awards. More details about this section
are set out in the “Appendix.”
Research Question 3: Amount and How to Determine the
Amount Respondents’ opinions on the amount of the
compensation were measured using two items (see “Results
and Discussion of Study 1” and “Results and Discussion of
Study 2” sections). Respondents were also asked for their
preferences for one of three alternative modes of determin-
ing the amount of the emotional harm award. Before
respondents were asked to choose their preferred mode,
they were given descriptions of these three alternative
modes (including their main advantages and disadvan-
tages), followed by items asking them to weigh the pros
and cons of the different modes. Descriptions and items
relating to the three modes of determining the amount were
randomly presented.
Research Question 4: Mode of Offering the Award Res-
pondents’ evaluations of various modalities of offering the
award were measured using 12 items (see Table 4 of the
“Appendix”).
Research Question 5: Explanatory Variables Lastly, we
examined how our main outcome measures were influenced
by a large number of demographic and explanatory
variables (see “Results and Discussion of Study 1” and
“Results and Discussion of Study 2” sections).
Procedure
Participants received a letter by (e-)mail inviting them to
participate in research about needs of victims’ relatives. The
fact that the research also included research into monetary
awards for emotional losses to relatives was not disclosed.
The questionnaire was administered online and respondents
could complete it on their own computers at a time
convenient to them. Panel respondents received a modest
payment of 3 €. After completing the questionnaire,
respondents recruited from outside the Panel were offered
a1 0€ gift voucher.
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We performed multivariate analyses of covariance (MAN-
COVA) on mean scores on three dependent variables (i.e.,
the scales assessing need for, and appreciation of, awards
for emotional harm and the single item asking for
participants’ opinions on an amount of 10,000 €). We
chose MANCOVA and follow-up ANCOVAs because we
were instructed to examine group differences between
surviving relatives of fatal victims and relatives of those
who had been seriously injured. We adjusted for differences
across groups in gender, age, education, and income by
using these variables as covariates. To examine the effects
of explanatory variables on our main outcome measures,
we performed other MANCOVAs and follow-up ANCO-
VAs, again using demographic variables as covariates, for
relatives of victims with fatal and non-fatal injuries
separately.
Results and Discussion of Study 1
Cases Included
In the analyses, data were used from 463 respondents
falling within the narrowly defined circle of secondary
victims who would be entitled to an award under the Dutch
Bill. These comprised 391 relatives of severely injured
victims and 72 relatives of fatal victims (see Table 1).
Results relied on a dataset that was also used in an earlier
report in Dutch to the Dutch Ministry of Justice (Akkermans
et al. 2008).
Research Question 1: Do Secondary Victims Feel a Need
for Such Award?
The mean score on the six-item scale assessing whether
secondary victims actually felt a need to receive a monetary
award for emotional harm was 4.81, with a standard
deviation of 1.42 (1, strongly disagree,t o7 ,strongly
agree). This mean deviated significantly from the middle of
the response scale, t(460)=12.25, p<0.001. Outcomes
show that a vast majority of secondary victims responded
slightly positively to the possibility of receiving such an
award (see Fig. 1). Only for 4% of respondents did the
categorized mean scores on the scale assessing the need for
emotional harm awards fall in the two lowest response
categories. This indicates that a small minority strongly felt
that they should not receive such an award (see “Appendix,”
Table 3, for means and standard deviations on individual
items of this scale).
Research Question 2: Does an Award Help Meet
Psychological Concerns?
The mean score on the 13-item scale assessing whether
these family members felt that receiving a monetary award
for emotional harm would help satisfy psychological needs
of secondary victims (in general) was 5.22, with a standard
deviation of 1.17 (1, strongly disagree,t o7 ,strongly
agree). This mean score deviated significantly from the
middle of the response scale, t(461)=22.29, p<0.001.
As Fig. 2 shows, for 3% of the secondary victims, the
categorized mean on this scale fell within the lowest two
categories of the seven-point scale indicating that they
expected such an award to have a strongly negative effect on
the fulfillment of their psychological needs. For 43% of
respondents, the categorized mean fell within the highest two
response categories—and for 75% in the highest three—
indicating that they expected an award for emotional harm to
help satisfy secondary victims’ psychological needs.
Secondary victims seemed to regard the award primarily
as:
& Acknowledgment of the harm-doer’s responsibility for
the incident and ensuing harm: “A right to compensa-
tion for emotional loss means that the responsible
party ‘acknowledges his fault’ (M=5.27); ‘is liable’
(M=5.77); ‘is forced to realize the emotional burden on
family members’.” (M=5.64).
& Recognition by the legal system of the emotional harm
and as fair treatment of victims’ family members: “A
right to compensation for emotional loss would mean
that: ‘the Dutch legal system acknowledges the emo-
tional outcome of the accident for family members’
(M=5.89); ‘the Dutch legal system treats family
members fairly’.” (M=5.54). See Table 2 for the means
on individual scale items.
Background for Research Question 2: Relatives’ Main
Justice Concerns and How These Relate to an Award Re-
search question 2 concerned whether an award would help
meet secondary victims’ psychological concerns. We
Table 1 Study 1—number of close family members of severely and
fatally injured victims included in the analyses and their distribution
across incident categories
Type of incident Relatives of
Injured victims Fatal victims
Traffic accident 238 40
Workplace accident 68 6
Medical malpractice 42 16
Violent crime 43 10
Total 391 72
Adapted from Akkermans et al. (2008).
Psychol. Inj. and Law (2011) 4:245–262 251consequently wanted to know our respondents’ main
concerns and motivations in respect of the legal processes
they had gone through following the death or injury of their
loved one (compensation claims for economic losses and/or
criminal procedures). More specifically, therefore, we also
asked our respondents to state which three aspects relating
to the legal process had, or would have, contributed most to
their emotional recovery (individual Top Three needs; see
“Appendix” for more details).
7
The subgroup of relatives of tort victims stated that it
was important for their own emotional recovery:
& That the pecuniary damage was “indeed settled” (12.7%;
M=5.09, SD=1.82) “in a smooth and swift manner”
(15.1%; M=5.29,SD=1.86)“by the harm-doer’s insurer”
& That the responsible party “acknowledges his/her fault”
(12.8%; M=4.97, SD=1.95), “apologizes” (11.4%; M=
5.08, SD=1.96), “shows empathy for the consequences”
(10.1% M=5.18, SD=1.86), and “realizes the conse-
quences for the victim” (8.1%; M=4.80, SD=1.88)
In other words, secondary accident victims desired swifter
compensationofeconomiclosses(27.8%ofresponses onTop
Three needs) but also an acknowledgment of responsibility
and the ensuing losses by the harm-doer (42.4% of their
responses in the Top Three needs).
As far as their emotional recovery was concerned, the
subgroup of relatives of violent crime victims deemed it most
important for the offender to be was “found guilty” (18.1%;
M=5.12, SD=1.78) and “punished” (17.5%; M=4.67, SD=
2.04) by “ac r i m i n a lc o u r t , ” as well as “that action is taken to
prevent similar future crimes” (9.4%; M=4.87, SD=1.60).
8
We then re-presented each respondent’s individual Top
Three of needs previously rated as most important to their
emotional recovery, but with the addition, at place four, of a
right to an award for emotional harm. We asked respondents
once again to rank the three aspects they considered most
important to their own emotional recovery. For 19% of
relatives of injured victims and 11% of relatives of fatal
victims, an emotional harm award then entered the individual
Top Three, while for the remaining respondents their
individual Top Three remained unchanged. Hence, these
findings indicated that an award was expected to contribute
less to emotional recovery than the other aspects/needs and
that receiving a monetary award for emotional harm was not
respondents’ primary concern. Our other findings that
respondents interpreted the emotional harm award as an
acknowledgment of fault/liability and losses by the harm-
doer may lend some support to the view that such an award
could indirectly help to meet secondary tort victims’ main
concerns for acknowledgment of fault and recognition of
harm.
Fig. 1 Study 1—frequency
distribution of categorized
means on the scale assessing
need for emotional harm
awards, in percentages. Adapted
from Akkermans et al. 2008
7 How often various aspects were mentioned in individual Top Three
needs is indicated in parentheses. In addition, we report how each aspect
was regarded as contributing to emotional recovery on a seven-point
scale; the higher the number, the more important this aspect was for
emotional recovery. The numbers of occasions on which aspects were
mentioned as most, second-most, and third-most important were added
and given the same weight. The use of other weights barely changed the
order of the nine most important aspects. We cannot report the
percentages of respondents expressing specific categories of needs.
8 This group also rated correct treatment by the Public Prosecutor’s
Office (M=5.55, SD=0.95) and attentive treatment by the police (M=
5.41, SD=1.40) as important for their emotional recovery (although
these aspects did not make it into the overall Top Three needs).
However, secondary violent crime victims felt that an apology from
the offender (M=3.67, SD=2.45) or the offender’s expression of
empathy for the consequences (M=3.24, SD=2.29) would not
contribute to their emotional recovery (cf. “acknowledges his fault,”
M=4.48, SD=2.12).
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Standardization or Individuation of Amounts, and How Do
They Evaluate the Amount?
We asked respondents for their preference for one of three
alternative modes of determining the amount of the emotional
harm award.
9 These three modes were a fixed amount (the
Dutch Bill included a fixed, uniform amount), a variable
amount (to be determined for each individual case), or a
standardized amount (based on tables specifying amounts for
different categories of relationships and injuries). A total of
36.1% of the respondents preferred a variable amount, while
28.3% of respondents indicated a preference for a standard-
ized amount and 15.8% preferred a fixed amount. A total of
19.9% of respondents answered Don’tk n o w .
Responsesonadditionalitemsweighingtheadvantagesand
disadvantages of the three modes of determining the amount
also suggested that respondents found individuation more
important than swift resolution and not having to negotiate.
10
Regarding the amount of the monetary award, we asked
participants “If a fixed amount is chosen, what do you think
of €10,000 as a fixed amount?,” using a seven-point scale
ranging from 1, much too low,t o7 ,much too high. The
mean score on this item was 3.5 (SD=1.58), which
significantly deviated from the middle of the seven-point
scale, t(445)=−6.69, p<0.001. A total of 45% of the sample
had a neutral view on an amount of 10,000€ (4, middle of
scale), while 28% of the sample regarded this amount as too
low and 8.5% as too high. Over 13% of the sample chose
not to answer this question. We found that surviving
relatives were more likely than relatives of seriously injured
persons to regard the amount of 10,000€ as being too low,
multivariate F(3, 342)=9.14, p<0.001, and univariate F(1,
344)=27.14, <0.001 (Ms adjusted for gender, age, educa-
tion, and income, 2.51 vs. 3.70).
11
We also asked “Can you try to indicate what amount you
would find appropriate in your situation?” Participants
could fill in amounts (which were categorized for the
purposes of the analyses), or choose No reply. On average,
relatives of injured persons indicated an amount between
10,000€ and 25,000€, while surviving relatives indicated
an average amount of between 50,000€ and 100,000€.A
total of 13% of relatives of injured victims and 22% of
surviving relatives did not complete this open-ended item.
Research Question 4: How Should the Award be Offered?
Participants seemed to appreciate emphasis being placed on
the symbolic nature of the award. Written communication by
the insurance company or compensation fund expressing
empathy seemedtobe appreciated byparticipants, but a home
visit couldalsobeappropriate (seeTable4of“Appendix,” for
means and standard deviations on items about modalities of
offering). A large majority of secondary tort victims also
appreciated receiving a letter from the harm-doer (M=5.61,
SD=1.59, with 63% choosing the highest two response
categories and 5.2% choosing the lowest two response
categories) but not a home visit. Relatives of violent crime
Fig. 2 Study 1—frequency
distribution of categorized
means on the scale assessing
appreciation of awards for
emotional harm, in percentages.
Adapted from Akkermans
et al. 2008
9 Relatives of injured persons and surviving relatives did not differ
significantly in their answers to this question, χ²(3)=4.37, p=0.225.
10 For example, “I find it important that my personal circumstances
are taken into account, even if this leads to having to negotiate and to
a lengthier settlement process” (M=5.15, SD=1.68, on the standard
seven-point scale).
11 Surviving relatives and relatives of injured persons did not differ
significantly with respect to their means on the scale assessing need
for emotional harm awards and on the scale assessing appreciation of
emotional harm awards, as follow-up ANCOVAs indicated.
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offender. Participants seemed to appreciate emphasis being
placed on the symbolic nature of the award.
Research Question 5: Variables Influencing Main
Results?
12
When respondents assigned more blame to the harm-doer,
this was associated with an increased need for, and a higher
appreciation of, an award for emotional harm.
13 Interest-
ingly, however, we found no effects of blame on opinions
regarding the amount of 10,000€, or on the amounts that
respondents themselves stated to be appropriate.
For non-fatal injuries, a greater impact of the injuries on
the daily life of the primary and secondary victims was
associated with an increased need for, and with greater
appreciation of, such award.
14 Importantly, no association
was found between the impact of the injuries and relatives’
sense that 10,000€ was the right amount.
We found no differences between violent crime and
accidental harm or between categories of family relationships
(i.e.,whether the victim was the child,partner, or parentof the
respondent)withrespecttothemainoutcomes(onlytestedfor
the group of relatives of injured persons). Finally, no
significant effects were found for the remaining explanatory
variables
15 on any of the main outcomes. With respect to
demographic variables (age, gender, education, and financial
income), minor yet significant effects on our main outcome
measures were found for education and age.
Study 2: Interviews in Belgium
As mentioned earlier, the key objective of study 2 was to
learn from experience in Belgium regarding how awards for
emotional harm should be determined and offered (research
questions 3 and 4). An additional goal was to complement
15 Number of hours the family member spent taking care of the victim,
the estimated total amount of pecuniary damage, the emotional
closeness between the family member and victim at the time of the
incident, and the time interval since the incident.
Table 2 Study 1—mean scores and standard deviations on separate
items of scale assessing appreciation of awards for emotional harm
(n=463)
Means
(standard
deviations)
Times “no
reply/not
applicable”
To me, a right to compensation for
emotional loss means some
recognition.
5.11 (1.77) 12
Compensation for emotional loss to
family members could help in coming
to terms with the emotional consequences
the accident had for me.
4.47 (1.89) 12
I find compensation for emotional loss
an appropriate manner to pay attention
to the emotional consequences for
family members.
5.0 (1.73) 12
Apart from my personal preferences, I
think it is a good idea for other family
members to get the opportunity to receive
compensation for emotional loss.
a
5.52 (1.59) 9
Apart from my personal preferences, I
think compensation for emotional
loss would contribute to the
emotional recovery of other
family members.
a
5.25 (1.62) 9
A right to compensation for emotional
loss for family members…
…means that the responsible party
acknowledges his fault
5.27 (1.74) 3
…means that the responsible party is
liable
5.77 (1.34) 7
…means that the responsible party is
forced to realize the emotional burden
on family members
5.64 (1.56) 5
…means that the responsible party is
being asked to make a sacrifice
5.06 (1.77) 7
… would mean that the Dutch legal
system acknowledges the emotional
outcome of the accident for family
members
5.89 (1.26) 8
… would mean that the Dutch legal
system treats family members fairly
5.54 (1.42) 7
… would help the social environment
to recognize the emotional consequences
of the accident for family members
4.77 (1.71) 11
… would help the social environment to
see that someone else (and not the victim)
is responsible for the accident
4.74 (1.77) 10
Standard deviations appear in parentheses. All ratings were done on a
seven-point scale (the higher the number, the higher the expected level
of contribution of this award to needs). The same items used for
relatives of parties injured in accidents were also used for relatives of
violent crime victims, but with minor modifications in terminology
(“crime” instead of “accident”; “offender” instead of “responsible
party”). Adapted from Akkermans et al. (2008).
aCorrelations between the two items starting with “Apart from my
personal preferences” and the scale assessing appreciation of
emotional harm awards did not deviate from the mean correlations
between other scale items and this scale. This finding may help
disqualify the alternative explanation that respondents simply gave
socially desirable answers.
14 Multivariate F(3, 337)=19.78, p<0.001; for need univariate F(1,
339)=58.09, p<0.001; and for appreciation univariate F(1, 339)=
28.49, p=0.025. To assess the extent to which the injuries impacted on
the victim and the relative (injury severity or impact), we used a six-
item scale, Cronbach’s α=0.75.
13 For both non-fatal incidents, multivariate F(3, 337)=3.85, p=0.01,
univariate F(1, 339)=11.00, p=0.001 and F(1, 339)=5.05, p=0.025,
respectively, and fatal incidents, multivariate F(3, 37)=3.30, p=0.031,
univariate F(1, 39)=7.62, p=0.009 and F(1, 39)=8.12, p=0.007,
respectively.
12 These main outcomes were respondents’ means on the scales
assessing need for and appreciation of emotional harm awards and on
responses regarding the amount.
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on the experience of actual recipients of such awards.
Method in Study 2
Participants
We conducted semi-structured interviews with 14 secondary
victims inBelgium who had received monetarycompensation
for the emotional harm they suffered as a result of the death or
severe injury of a close relative (adults, Flemish-speaking,
with incidents occurring between 1990 and 2007).
16 Surviv-
ing relatives were over-represented (11), especially those of
car crash victims (nine). Our sample was small due to
severe recruitment difficulties (which may stem from the
fact that our target population was relatively small in
number and may also have been hesitant to participate
in research about their traumatic experience).
Materials and Analyses
Two psychologists conducted semi-structured interviews,
while two other social scientists analyzed transcripts. Analy-
ses consisted of labeling statements in which participants
expressed their experience of receiving an award for emo-
tional harm relating to the death or injury of a relative. Data
were analyzed according to a process of open-, axial-, and
selective coding (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Firstly, the
transcripts were labeled with five main elements (based on
the research questions): “amount of the award,”“ manner of
determining,”“ manner of offering,”“ experience of the
compensation for emotional harm,” and “how was the
compensation spent.” Secondly, certain subcomponents were
added during the analysis (such as “kind of recognition” and
“not making up for suffering”). Eventually, no new themes
emerged and data saturation was reached. Thirdly, all the
transcripts were re-analyzed on the basis of the new list of
labels. Subcomponents appearing in at least three of the 14
interviews were used and described. Discrepancies between
the two analyzers were resolved through discussion. The
computer software program Atlas.ti (version 5.2) was used
for assigning and analyzing the labels.
Results and Discussion of Study 2
In study 2, interviewees were asked how the amount of the
compensation had been determined and how they had
experienced this.
17 A clear theme in the qualitative study in
Belgium was that interviewees considered it of crucial
importance that they should not have to negotiate the
amount of the compensation. Any such negotiations were
characterized as debates about the monetary value of the
victim’s life.Intervieweesstatedthat suchdebates wouldhave
been morally offensive and overly distressing. A Belgian
surviving relative said that “People should not be forced into
bargaining about life, its monetary values … it angers me,
bargaining the way you would at a flea market.” Some
intervieweesmadecomparisons onhow somebodyelse’sp a i n
appeared to be worth more than their own. These findings
seem to conflict with the preference of most respondents in
study 1 that individuation information would be taken into
account in determining the amount of the award.
We asked interviewees how the award had been offered
to them. It appeared that they had often been notified of the
award in a strictly business-like manner (sometimes only by
being sent a copy of the letter sent to their lawyers). “It was
written in cold rationalistic terms. ‘You are receiving this
because …’ The letter was the same as the letter for the
damage to the car.”“ The letter referred to a file number,
just a file number. Not a person. And nothing emotional. A
‘cold fish’ letter.” As another relative said:
The letter included wording such as ‘with reference
to’ rather than something like ‘in view of the murder
of your daughter on that date, we have decided to
issue a payment in satisfaction, of this and that
amount’. It could also be done in more humane,
warm wording. They ought to mention the name of
the child rather than ‘Re: file number’.
The thread running through the responses was a desire for a
more personal approach, with reference to what had
happened rather than just to a file number.
Study 2 also indicated that the offering of compensation for
emotional harm was best organized separately from any
settlement of pecuniary damages. If such an award is presented
as just one of the items in the final financial settlement, the
special meaning attached to the award may fail to be conveyed.
Interviewees were also asked about their experience of
receiving compensation for emotional harm. They stated
that receiving this compensation had made them feel
recognized and supported in the loss they had personally
suffered and that this had helped them to come to terms
16 Participants were recruited through a Belgian market research
agency, which sent out a screening questionnaire among its own panel
and contacted all Flemish institutions and associations dealing with
these victim groups. In addition, 20 Belgian lawyers who were
members of a European network of lawyers specializing in personal
injury cases were asked to send invitation letters to their clients.
17 In Belgium, the scope of relatives’ rights to an award for emotional
harm is defined by case law. There is a non-binding, indicative table
of standardized amounts (based on case law and varying between
relationship categories and fatal vs. non-fatal). The standard amount
applying after the death of a child or partner is also 10,000€, but
courts are free to diverge from this. Belgian interviewees had
experienced different people receiving different amounts, but most
interviewees did not seem to have negotiated on the amount.
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compensation more as showing compassion with the
suffering I went through.” At the same time, however,
interviewees stated that their grief could not in itself be
financially compensated as money could not bring back
their child or spouse and that money could not make the
pain of losing a child or spouse disappear. With respect to
“spending,” it appeared that most participants spent the
money in a manner specifically relating to the deceased (a
family memorial, for example).
General Discussion
This work fills a gap in that it is the first empirical study of
how close relatives of those killed or severely injured
through tort or violent crime interpret and evaluate the
symbolic properties of a monetary award for emotional
harm suffered as a result of the death or serious injury of a
family member. Our research sought to test the assumptions
underlying proposed legislation in the Netherlands that the
provision of a modest, uniform sum could symbolize
recognition and satisfaction to victims’ relatives. In this
general discussion, we first examine secondary victims’
perceptions of an award for emotional harm. We then go on
to discuss that the manner in which an award is offered
seems to be of crucial importance in fulfilling the aim of
providing acknowledgment. Subsequently, we discuss
whether secondary victims preferred uniform or variable
sums, as well as their evaluations of the amount. Since
our key question was whether a monetary award could
provide acknowledgment to victims’ relatives, we also
wanted to establish relatives’ main concerns and
motivations regarding the legal process they had gone
through following the death or injury of their loved one
(compensation claims for economic losses and/or crim-
inal procedures). The present findings may be of interest
to legislators and policymakers around the world when
considering how to address the emotional harm suffered
by victims’ families.
Close Relatives’ Perceptions of Awards for Emotional
Harm
The results of both our quantitative and qualitative
empirical studies indicated that secondary victims regard
the offering of a monetary award for emotional harm as a
positive rather than offensive response to a death or severe
injury caused. Only a small minority strongly felt that they
should not receive such award (hence, relatives should be
free to refuse an award).
This research also shed light on how a monetary award
for emotional harm was perceived to be both positive and
helpful. Our findings suggested that most respondents
regarded an award as helping to meet secondary victims’
emotional needs.
18 Victims’ relatives seemed to view such
an award as a means to an end—in other words, to the end
of helping to satisfy primary emotional needs—rather than
as an end in itself. Results of study 1 indicated that
secondary victims interpreted the award as (implicit)
acknowledgement by the legal system of the family’s
emotional losses and as fair treatment of the victim’s
family. They also regarded this compensation as inter alia
(implicit) acknowledgment by the harm-doer of his fault/
liability and of the emotional losses suffered by the family.
The notion that the power of an award lies not in its
monetary but in its symbolic significance was also reflected
in our findings on the amount and in the finding that most
secondary victims did not see an award for emotional harm
in itself being among the most important things for their
emotional recovery. Respondents most often stated that
receiving acknowledgment of responsibility and/or recog-
nition of the ensuing losses (from the harm-doer—at least
after unintentional injuries, study 1) would have been most
important to their emotional recovery. Findings in study 1
indicated that respondents seemed to regard this award as
providing just that message of acknowledgment of respon-
sibility and recognition of losses (by the harm-doer and the
legal system).
19 Hence, the provision of an award for
emotional harm may perhaps indirectly help to satisfy
primary needs of victims’ relatives.
Distortions attributable to the Dutch respondents being
asked about a hypothetical award were minimized by
preventive measures and by the fact that our respondents
had suffered actual losses. We acknowledge that our Dutch
respondents’ perceptions on the acceptability of awards for
emotional harm may have been influenced by the fact that
the questionnaire did not frame the award in a “market-
pricing scheme” (i.e., it stated that the Bill recognized that
money could not truly make up for these losses). However,
the findings from the Belgian recipients’ experience also
suggested that receiving monetary compensation for emo-
tional harm made them feel recognized and supported in
their losses, although we should be cautious about these
findings because study 2 used a qualitative method and the
sample was small.
In conclusion, our quantitative (and qualitative) research
indicated that tort and crime victims’ relatives view the
provision of a monetary award for emotional harm as a
18 Needs that have been identified in existing literature on what
(litigating) crime and accident victims and their families want and
which were also consistent with the needs our respondents themselves
expressed.
19 A possible explanation could be that victims’ relatives may be
motivated by a desire to be seen positively by others and to feel good
about themselves (cf. Risen and Gilovich 2007).
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nition of loss and acknowledgment of responsibility. This
potentially symbolic power of such an award is interesting,
given that previous research indicated that survivors’
perceptions of social acknowledgment may be related to
their psychological adaptation to the traumatic stressor
(Maercker and Müller 2004). There may of course be
alternative, less compensation-centered ways to address
secondary victims’ emotional needs, such as by means of
apologies or other expressions of concern. However, a
monetary award may be the only legally enforceable
remedy.
Value Is in the Gesture: Manner of Offering Awards
for Emotional Harm
Our research suggested that a beneficial effect of the
money could depend on the way secondary victims
interpret the gesture. Findings from both studies sug-
gested that it is important for the emotional harm award
to be offered in a personal, respectful, and considerate
manner and for the special meaning of the money to be
emphasized. The results of the Belgian interviews
illustrated that people wanted the offering of the award
to be accompanied by an acknowledgment of what had
happened to their family member, preferably worded in
humane, warm terms.
Our findings indicated that victims’ relatives appre-
c i a t e dt h eo f f e r i n go fa na w a r db e i n gc o m b i n e dw i t ha
statement that the award was by no means intended to
make up for the loss as this was obviously incompen-
sable and instead was merely intended as a symbolic
gesture, expressing recognition of this loss. In addition,
our overall findings suggested that the symbolic func-
tion of an award for emotional harm would be
strengthened if the person or organization offering the
money paired this with (a) an explicit acknowledgment
of the harm-doer’s responsibility for causing the death
or injury of the primary victim and (b) an expression of
empathy with the loss. Although this notion was not
directly tested in our research, we found that these two
elements (responsibility-taking by the harm-doer and
empathy with loss) were of primary concern to
secondary accident victims (see findings on Top Three
needs). These elements may also be regarded as the two
main elements of an apology (Nadler and Liviatan
2006;S c h ö n b a c h1990). The notion that offering money
is more effective if accompanied by a message expressing
the taking of responsibility and showing empathy in
response to even unintentional (economic) harm is
supported by existing research in social psychology (e.g.,
Okimoto and Tyler 2007, even when coming from a
“group representative” of the harm-doer; Schmitt et al.
2004;S t r u t h e r se ta l .2008). Such affirmation may also
ease any moral distress caused by a monetary value being
placed on the death or severe injury of a loved one (cf.
Robbennolt et al. 2003). In this respect, developing and
using protocols for offering awards for emotional harm (to
be paid by insurers or victim compensation funds) may be
helpful.
The notion that injured parties are also sensitive to the
interpersonal message communicated by the manner in
which they are compensated (cf. Okimoto and Tyler 2007)
was not previously a subject of debate in Dutch legal
literature. Our findings on the importance of the manner in
which monetary awards are offered may also be relevant
with respect to compensation of other non-economic (and
even economic) harm.
Uniform vs. Variable Sums
A majority of respondents in study 1 expressed a
preference for some individuating information to be
taken into account in determining the amount of the
award (36.1% and 28.3%). Nevertheless, a substantial
percentage of respondents also indicated a preference for
some sort of standardization in determining the award
(15.8% and 28.3%). A clear theme in study 2 was that
Belgian interviewees found it crucially important not to
have to negotiate on the amount as that would have been
morally offensive and distressing (cf. Fiske and Tetlock
1997; Tetlock et al. 2000). In this respect, it should also be
noted that respondents in study 1 stated that swift
resolution of the economic damage was of primary
importance to their emotional recovery.
A plausible explanation of these mixed findings might
be that the preference expressed by most Dutch participants
for a degree of individual information in determining the
amount was not borne out by actual experience (of negative
aspects of variable amounts). However, Hadfield’s( 2008)
report on the experiences of the 11 September Victim
Compensation Fund (VCF) also revealed that claimants
valued individual judgments on the amount above a quick
financial award. Hensler (2003) also reported that payment
by the VCF of equal amounts for pain and suffering was
not regarded as important in comments from victims’
survivors (and the general public). Perhaps litigants
perceive a pre-set uniform monetary amount as being less
able to “value” the losses they have personally suffered
(Posner and Sunstein 2005).
20
One implication of our overall findings is that even when
using uniform amounts and out-of-court or administrative
forms of claim settlement, it could also be important to
20 Any system of awards for emotional harm would additionally raise
issues of eligibility (see also Hensler 2003).
Psychol. Inj. and Law (2011) 4:245–262 257address claimants’ non-monetary concerns (for recognition
of personal losses and acknowledgment of the violation of
norms) through the manner in which the award is offered
(cf. Hadfield 2008).
In addition, designing a system in which amounts are
varied on the basis of “objective” factors could be a way of
trying to accommodate any potential preference for indi-
viduation of amounts, while also attempting to prevent
offensive and lengthy debates. In study 1, however, we
found no basis for varying amounts (for example, relation-
ship category, blame assigned to the harm-doer, or injury
severity) other than a difference between relatives of fatal
victims and injured victims in their sense of the “right”
amount. In this respect, it is also interesting that we found
that more blame and a greater impact of the injuries were
both associated with a greater need for and higher
appreciation of an award, but not with a sense that the
amount of the award should be higher.
Together, our results lend some support to the notion that
a modest amount of 10,000€ would not be perceived as
inappropriate by the majority of relatives of severely
injured victims, although their own preferences were on
average higher. For surviving relatives of fatal victims,
however, 10,000€ certainly appeared to be too low. The
validity of our measures regarding the amount of the award
may perhaps be compromised as our respondents seemed to
find it difficult to place a monetary value on emotional loss
suffered (see in study 1: the high percentage of non-
completion on items concerning the amount, the finding
that 45% of respondents chose the midpoint response
option when asked how they evaluated 10,000€, and the
findings in study 2 about respondents not wanting to
negotiate the amount).
Our research was not aimed at examining how to
calculate levels of damages for non-economic harm result-
ing from the death or injury of a loved one. This focus can
be found in other literature based on economic approaches
of tort law (e.g., Avraham 2005; Mulder 2009, for reviews
on insurance theory; see also Oswald and Powdthavee
2008; Posner and Sunstein 2005; Sunstein 2008 on, for
example, hedonic adaptation, but cf. Swedloff and Huang
2010). Our findings tie in with these and other debates on
limitation of tort awards (on the basis of other economic
grounds put forward in that literature) in the sense that our
findings indicated that victims’ relatives are seeking for
their emotional losses and the norm violation to be
acknowledged and that modest amounts and/or apologies
may be a viable way of addressing these non-monetary
concerns.
In summary, our results do not provide clear answers as
to whether uniform amounts (fixed or standardized) are
better than variable amounts. However, our findings lend
support to the notion that even modest uniform amounts
may be better as a means of addressing the psychological
concerns of victims’ families than the awarding of no
damages following the death or severe injury of a loved
one.
Relatives’ Main Concerns for Justice
Our main objective was to investigate whether a
monetary award could symbolize an acknowledgment
to victims’ relatives by helping to satisfy relatives’
psychological concerns. For that reason, we also wanted
to know the main concerns and motivations of our
representative sample of victims’ relatives in respect of
the legal process. Our respondents had gone through
legal processes following the death or injury of their
loved ones in order to seek compensation of economic
losses and/or in criminal procedures. More specifically,
therefore, we also asked them to express their main
concerns regarding the legal process in relation to their
own emotional recovery. Here we found clear differ-
ences between violent crimes and torts (study 1).
Relatives of violent crime victims—in which the injuries
were inflicted intentionally—said that, as far as their
emotional recovery was concerned, it was most impor-
tant for the perpetrator to be convicted and punished.
On the other hand, secondary tort victims—in which the
injuries were inflicted unintentionally—deemed it most
important to their emotional recovery for their economic
losses to be compensated swiftly, but said even more
often that they would be helped most if the harm-doer
were to admit fault, recognize their losses, or apolo-
gize.
21 These findings suggest that compensation of
economic harm alone may be an inadequate response to
this unintentional harm (cf. Okimoto and Tyler 2007).
Interestingly, we found there to be no difference between
secondary victims of violent crime and secondary victims
of tort with respect to our main findings on awards for
emotional harm and that both groups equally appreciated
that an award could help meet their psychological needs.
22
Our findings suggested that relatives of victims of tort and
violent crime regarded an award for emotional harm as
representing a symbolic acknowledgment of their emo-
tional loss and the rule violation (by the harm-doer and by
society).
21 There may be situational and individual variability in such needs for
an apology from the harm-doer. This corresponded with another
finding in study 1 that a large majority of relatives of victims of tort
(but not of violent crime) would welcome a letter from the offender.
22 Our finding that victims’ relatives valued the involvement of the
victim compensation fund in offering the award could also suggest
that they would perceive such an award as a welcome community
response, reaffirming the societal boundaries that underlie the criminal
laws that have been broken (Tyler et al. 1997; Darley and Pittman
2003).
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Our results indicate that close relatives of fatally or seriously
injured tort and violent crime victims perceive a monetary
award for the emotional harm they have suffered as a positive
response to the death or severe injury of their loved one. Our
results suggest that people who have experienced the loss or
severe injury of a loved one may be seeking acknowledge-
ment of their emotional losses and the norm violation. Our
findings provide support for the view that a modest monetary
award may help meet secondary victims’ psychological
concerns. Results suggested that victims’ family members
viewed a monetary award as a means to an end, rather than as
an end in itself. It seems that money can symbolize
acknowledgment to victims’ relatives.
Our studies yielded conflicting findings as to whether
relatives preferred standardization or individuation of
amounts. In either case, it could be particularly important
to address relatives’ non-monetary concerns by means of
the manner in which the award is offered, given that our
results support the view that the value of a monetary award
is in the gesture. Our (qualitative) findings on the
importance of the manner in which monetary awards are
offered may also be relevant with respect to the provision of
monetary compensation for other forms of non-economic
(and even economic) harm. Our findings tie in with debates
on the limitation of tort awards in the sense that they
indicate that plaintiffs may also feel a need for a symbolic
message acknowledging the gravity of their emotional
losses and the rule violation (in addition to punishment of
criminal offenders and compensation of economic losses)
and that modest amounts and/or apologies may be a viable
way to address these non-monetary concerns.
Our research may represent an important first step in
understanding how close relatives of crime and tort victims
view monetary awards for non-economic harm. We should
be aware that there may be cultural and societal factors
influencing claimants’ views on such monetary awards.
Future research in other jurisdictions on samples of people
who have received awards for non-economic harm could be
valuable, even though such attempts could once again be
hindered by recruitment problems.
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Appendix
A copy of the entire questionnaire and interview
protocol (in Dutch) can be obtained from the authors.
Details about the section assessing the context of
respondents’ experiences and concerns in the legal
process in the aftermath of the death or injury of their
family member are set out below. Items in the first part
of this section asked about aspects of the legal process
(did you experience this: yes/no) and how that aspect
had (in the event of a “yes” answer) or could have (in
the event of “no”) contributed to their emotional
recovery (on a scale ranging from 1 (definitely not)t o
7( definitely so)o rno reply/not applicable). In this part of
this section, the statements included below were worded in
the past tense (e.g., “The responsible party/offender was
found guilty by a court, or other institution”). In a second
part of this section, respondents were asked to express which
three aspects were or would have been most important to their
own emotional recovery as set out below.
Please read all the answers carefully first.
Which of these aspects do you find most important
for your own recovery?
– That a court (or other institution) finds the
responsible party/offender guilty.
– That a court (or other institution) punishes or
imposes a fine on the responsible party/offender.
– That the responsible party acknowledges his fault
(swiftly).
– That the responsible party acknowledges legal
liability (swiftly).
– That the responsible party apologizes.
– That the responsible party voluntarily pays a
monetary amount for the emotional impact on me.
– That the responsible party expresses empathy.
– That the responsible party sufficiently realizes the
consequences for the victim.
– That the responsible party sufficiently realizes the
consequences for me as a close relative of the victim.
– That the responsible party’s insurer provides for
swift resolution of the (financial) losses.
– That the responsible party’s insurer compensates the
financial losses (loss of income and costs incurred).
Psychol. Inj. and Law (2011) 4:245–262 259– That the responsible party’s insurer pays attention to
the emotional impact on me.
– That action is taken to prevent similar crimes/
accidents in the future.
– That it is clear to the outside world that someone
else is responsible for the accident.
[Additional items for violent crimes:]
– That the Victim Support officer provides me with
adequate support.
– That the police treat me correctly.
– That the police pay attention to the emotional
impact on me as a family member.
– That the Public Prosecutor’sO f f i c et r e a t sm ec o r r e c t l y .
– That the Public Prosecutor’s Office pays attention to
the emotional impact on me as a family member.
[Additions that were made by respondents included]
“support and empathy from family, friends” etc., “my
faith” and “an apology from the wrongdoer.”
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